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legislature."' But, in West Virginia the Supreme Court of Appeals
has inherent power as well as statutory authorization to prescribe,
promulgate, and amend rules of procedure.20 Consequently, even
if the West Virginia court takes the view that the doctrine of forum
non conveniens is purely a procedural matter, recognition of the
doctrine would be directly within the rule making power of the court.
Whether the West Virginia court will adopt the doctrine of forum
non conveniens in the shadow of the good cause statute is a question
yet to be answered. Two arguments that could be made for such
an adoption would be the handling of the matter in other states with
good cause statutes and the inherent common law power of courts
to decline to exercise jurisdiction when a more appropriate forum
exists. But the reasoning in Trahan could also be set forth, and
perhaps convincingly enough to influence the court to render a
similar decision.
PeterThomas Denny

Torts-Comparative Negligence Adopted by Judicial Decision
Wrongful death action was brought for the death of P's decedent.
P failed to allege that decedent exercised ordinary care for his own
safety at the time of the accident.' P did allege that if there was any
negligence on the part of the decedent, it was less than the negligence
of the P when the two were compared. The D moved to dismiss for
failure to state a cause of action. Motion allowed, and P appealed
to the Supreme Court of Illinois. The Supreme Court transferred
the case to the Appellate Court for the Second District stating that
the question of whether the rules that contributory negligence barred
recovery should be changed, as a matter of justice and public
policy, was a matter that needed consideration. Held, the action
could not be defeated by negligence of P's decedent unless such
negligence was at least equal to that of defendant; but, P's damages
would be diminished in proportion to the amount of negligence
19
200 So. 2d 118, 122 (La. 1967).
20
Order of the Supreme Court of Appeals of W. Va., Oct. 13, 1959,
promulgating the W. Va. Rules of Civil Procedure for trial courts of record,
144 W. Va. xii; W. VA. CODE ch. 51, art. 1, § 4a (Michie 1966).
1In Illinois the plaintiff has the burden of showing that he was not
contributorily negligent. Aurora Branch R.R. v. Grimes, 13 IM. 585, 587
(1852); Clubb v. Main, 65 Ill. App. 2d 461, 470, 213 N.E.2d 63, 67 (1965).
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Maki v. Frelk, 229 N.E.2d 284,

(Ill. App. Ct. 2d Dist. 1967).
The doctrine of contributory negligence was historically a creature
of the courts, not of the legislature.2 The Illinois Appellate Court
for the Second District found the doctrine to be unsound and unjust
under present conditions, and stated that the courts not only had
the right but the duty to abolish contributory negligence as a complete defense. The doctrine that contributory negligence is a complete
bar to recovery originated 3 in the English case of Butterfield v.
Forrester.' There it was held that two elements were necessary to
support the action of negligence: (1) negligence on the part of
the defendant; and (2) "no want of ordinary care" on the part of
the plaintiff.' The asserted hardship of the contributory negligence
doctrine is that the plaintiff is completely barred from recovery if
his own negligence has to any degree contributed as a proximate cause
to the act causing the injury.6 Contributory negligence will not
defeat recovery if it remotely caused the injury, however recovery
will be barred if the contributory negligence is the proximate or
concurrent cause of the injury.' Contributory negligence "places
upon one party the entire burden of a loss for which two are, by
hypothesis, responsible." 8
Comparative negligence may be defined as follows: even though
the plaintiff was negligent and even though his negligence, concurring
with the negligence of the defendant, proximately caused his injury,
he may still recover.9 That is, in comparative negligence the causative character of plaintiff's act will not bar recovery, subject to
certain limitations.'" Whether plaintiff's act was a contributing,
Maki v. Frelk, 229 N.E.2d 284, 291 (Ill. App. Ct. 2d Dist. 1967).
' Turk, Comparative Negligence on the March, 28 Cm-KENT L. REv.
189 (1950); Green, Illinois Negligence Law, 39 ILL. L. REv. 36 (1944);
W. PROSSER, Tm LAw oF TORTS, 426 n. 1 (3d ed. 1964).
4 11 East. 60, 103 Eng. Rep. 926, 19 Eng. Rul. Cas. 189 (1809).
- Id. at 61, Eng. Rep. at 927, Eng. Rul. Cas. at 190.
6 Turk, Comparative Negligence on the March, 28 Cm-KENT L. REv.
189, 199 (1950). See, e.g., McMicken v. Province, 141 W. Va. 273, 90 S.E.2d
348, 59 A.L.R.2d 470 (1958); Smith v. Gould, 110 W. Va. 579, 159 S.E.
53, 92 A.L.R. 28 (1934); Haeg v. Sprague, Warner and Co., 281 N.W. 261,
263, 7202 Minn. 425 (1938) (discussing the "hardship" of the doctrine).
Annot., 114 A.L.R. 830, 831 (1938). The annotation defines the
doctrine of contributory negligence and comparative negligence but other
than the basic definitions used, the annotation is inaccurate and outdated in
the discussion of the forms of comparative negligence.
a9 Tsn LAw OF TORTS, supranote 3, at 443.
Annot., 114 A.L.R. 830, 831 (1938).
10 Id.
2
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proximate or concurring cause is unimportant as long as it is not
the sole cause.
The limitation which will bar recovery depends on which one of
the three forms of comparative negligence the particular jurisdiction
has adopted. The pure form of comparative negligence is demonstrated by the Federal Employers' Liability Act," which applies to
negligence actions in federal or state courts, as a result of an injury
to a railroad employee engaged in interstate commerce."2 Contributory negligence may be used to diminish the damages in proportion
to the amount of negligence attributable to plaintiff. 3 Under the
pure form of comparative negligence a defendant guilty of 1% of
the total negligence is liable for 1% of the total damages." The
defendant is liable in proportion to the percentage of the total negligence attributable to him.
Another form of comparative negligence is the modified form.
This is the type adopted by the court in the principal case. Plaintiff
is entitled to recovery unless his own negligence is at least equal
to the defendant's; but plaintiff's damages may be reduced by the
proportion of the negligence attributed to him.' 5 That is, a plaintiff
whose negligence was 49 % of the total, as compared with defendant's
51%, may recover 51% of the damages; but if plaintiff were guilty
of 50% of the negligence he could recover nothing." Wisconsin' 7
is one of the states which have adopted this form by statute."
"45 U.S.C. §§ 51-60 (1964).

'2 Prosser, Comparative Negligence, 51 Mica. L. REv. 465, 478 (1953);
McGivern v. Northern Pacific Ry., 132 F.2d 213 (8th Cir. 1942).
,3Keller v. Penn R. R., 100 F. Supp. 50, 51 (W.D. Penn. 1951); Wetherbee v. Elgin, J.& E. Ry., 191 F.2d 302, (7th Cir. 1951); Hutchins v. Akron,
Canton & Youngstown R. R., 162 F.2d 189 (6th Cir. 1947); Alabama Great
Southern
R. R v.Baum 249 Ala. 442, 31 So. 2d 366 (1947).
' 4 Atten, Should Ilinois Adopt a Comparative Negligence Statute? Yes!,
51 ILL. B. J. 194, 201 (1962). For a discussion of the method of damage
apportionment when two parties are injured see Turk, Comparative Negligence
on the March, 28 Cm-KET L. REv. 189, 207 (1950). Some additional
problems are raised which are beyond the scope of this comment, when more
than two parties are injured. A discussion of this can be found in C. GREGoRY,

LEGISLATIVE

Loss DisTRIBuTIoN

rN NEGLIGENCE CASES

(1936).

,5
Maid v. Frelk, 229 N.E.2d 284, 291 (IMI.App. Ct. 2d Dist. 1967).
' 67 Atten., supra note 14, at 201.
WIScoN sN STATUTEs ANNOTATED 895.045 (West 1966). "Contributory
negligence shall not bar recovery in an action by any person or his legal
representative to recover damages for negligence resulting in death or in
injury to person or property, if such negligence was not as great as the
negligence of the person against whom recovery is sought, but any damages
allowed shall be diminished in the proportion to the amount of negligence
attributable to the person recovering."
18 For illustrative cases see Grana v. Summerford, 12 Wis. 2d 517, 107
N.W.2d 463 (1961) holding that the comparison of negligence is deter-
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The third type is the "slight and gross" form of comparative
negligence. 9 Under this view the doctrine of contributory negligence
is modified only where plaintiff's negligence is "slight" and that of
the defendant's is "gross" in comparison. However this form has
little to recommend it since it shifts the entire loss from the plaintiff
to the defendant, when both parties are still at fault.2 That is, there
is no attempt to divide damages and if the rule applies2 ' plaintiff
gets full recovery.2 2 This form of comparative negligence no longer
exists at common law,23 although it is embodied in a few statutes.2 4
There are three principal arguments for adopting some form of
comparative negligence. First, it is a general principle that when the
reason for a rule has disappeared, the court will reconsider the law.
Some argue that the doctrine of contributory negligence was created
to protect growth of industry and it is contended that this is no
longer a valid justification for retaining it as an absolute defense.2 5
Second, comparative negligence will tend to induce pretrial settlement.2 6 Third, the doctrine of comparative negligence produces a
more just distribution of loss.2 There are two parties, both by
hypothesis responsible for a loss; plaintiff's negligence may have
been slight, but plaintiff is completely barred from recovery and must
bear the entire loss himself under a contributory negligence rule.2
The arguments against comparative negligence are similarly varied.
First, the harsh doctrine of contributory negligence is compromised
by the jury and these compromised verdicts mitigate any harshness
of the contributory negligence doctrine.2 9 Authorities agree that
this occurs.30 However, at least one commentator states that such
mined by the degree of contribution to the total negligence; see Taylor v.
Western Cas. & Sur. Co., 270 Wis. 408, 71 N.W.2d 363 (1955); Dinger v.
McCoy Transportation Co., 251 Wis. 265, 29 N.W.2d 60 (1947).
'9 This was the form of comparative negligence used in Illinois from
1858 to approximately 1894. The form was abandoned because of the
problems involved. For a discussion see Green, Illinois Negligence Law,
39 ILL.
2 0 L. PEv. 36 (1944).
THE LAw OF ToRTs, supra note 3, at 444.
2
'Id., Prosser, Comparative Negligence, 51 MicH. L. REv. 465, 484
(1953).
22
1d.
23 Tsk LAw OF TORTS, supra note 3, at 445.
24
TnE LAw OF TORTS, supranote 3, at 445, n. 56.
25 Maid v. Frelk, 229 N.E.2d 284, 286 (Ill. App. Ct. 2d Dist. 1967).
26 Atten., supra note 14, at 197.
27
1d.

28 THE LAw OF ToRTs, supra note 3, at 443.
2

9 Atten., supra note 14, at 197.

30

Keeton, Creative Continuity In the Law of Torts, 75 HAnv. L. REv.
463, 506 (1962); accord, Haeg v. Sprague, Warner & Co., 202 Minn. 425,
281 N.W. 261, 263 (1938).
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duplicity is a reason for adopting comparative negligence since the
compromised verdict is a "corroding influence" on the public
attitudes about law and legal institutions." Secondly, comparative
negligence will not encourage settlements because plaintiff is more
likely to recover something, and thus insurance and defense costs will
increase.32 The third argument is that a case of questionable liability
is more likely to be filed for trial and thus create more congestion
in the courts.33
Apparently the Illinois Appellate Court in the principal case felt
that the argument for the adoption of comparative negligence was
the better view. In response to the transfer order from the Supreme
Court of Illinois the appellate court rejected the common law
defense of contributory negligence as an absolute bar by judicial
decision rather than by action of the state legislature.3" The Illinois
code adopts the common law of England "prior to the fourth year
of James the First" as the law of Illinois except as modified by the
legislature.3" The fourth year of James the First began 1606." The
doctrine of contributory negligence was created in the English case
of Butterfield v. Forrester in 1809"7 and therefore was not part of
the common law as adopted from England. Contributory negligence
was established by judicial decision in Illinois in 1852,"8 and thus
there was no constitutional bar to the abrogation by the court of the
defense as a bar to recovery.
As late as 1955, there were 26 states which had adopted a rule
of comparative negligence in one type of action or another.39 West
Virginia would be in the minority in being one of the fewer states
that has no form of comparative negligence. "
31
Keeton, supra note 30, at 506.
32
Atten., supranote 14, at 197.
33 Id. These last two arguments are the converse of the view that

comparative negligence wvill encourage pretrial settlement. The results of a

survey
on these questions are found in Atten., supra note 14, at 202.
34
App. Ct. 2d Dist. 1967).
Mali v. Frelk, 229 N.E.2d 284, 291 (Ill.
(There
85 SIrr-HuRD ILLINOIS ANNOTATED STATUTES 28-1 (1934).
exceptions not pertinent to this discussion).
are certain
36
Lasier v. Wright, 304 Ill.
130, 135, 136 N.E. 545, 547 (1922).
37 11 East. 60, 103 Eng. Rep. 926, 19 Eng. Rul. Cas. 189 (1809).
585 (1852). Green, Illinois
Aurora Branch R. R. v. Grimes, 13 Ill.
Law, 39 ILL. L. REv. 36, 43 (1944).
Negligence
39
Atten., supra note 14, at 196.
40 Workmen's Compensation laws abolish the defense of contributory
negligence and allow damages. But because of the social policy and underlying theory of the statutes they are not considered comparative negligence
statutes.
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The West Virginia courts have clearly held that comparative
negligence does not apply in West Virginia." A judicial reversal
of this view, as in the principal case, would appear to be contrary

to the constitution and laws of the state. The constitution42 and
laws 3 of West Virginia adopt as the law of West Virginia, the common law of England, except as altered by the Virginia Assembly
prior to June 20, 1863, or has been, or shall be altered by the
legislature of this state. Therefore if the common law rule existed
at the time of the adoption of the present44 West Virginia Constitution, then it is still the law of the State, and apparently can only be
changed by the Legislature.4 5 Butterfield v. Forrester was decided
in 1809 and the present West Virginia Constitution was adopted in
1872.
Therefore, it would appear on first impression, that if comparative
negligence were to be adopted in West Virginia it must be done by
legislative action; however, there is a possibility of judicial determination of the question. The West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals
has held that under the common law when the reason for a rule
ceases, the rule itself ceases. 6 Under this rule, it appears that
notwithstanding the applicable constitutional and statutory provisions,
the court may change the common law as adopted by West Virginia
without legislative action.47 This raises the question of whether such
4' Eastern Gas and Fuel Associates v. Midwest-Raleigh Inc., 253 F. Supp.
954, 963 (N.D. W. Va. 1966); MeMicken v. Province, 141 W. Va. 273,
279, 90 S.E.2d 348, 352, 59 A.L.R.2d 470 (1955); Otte v. Miller, 125 W. Va.
317, 325, 24 S.E.2d 90, 94 (1943).
42 W. VA. CONST. art. VIII, § 21. "Such parts of the common law, and
of the laws of this State as are in force when tis article goes into operation,
and are not repugnant thereto, shall be and continue the law of the State
until 4 altered
or repealed by the Legislature .... "
3
W. VA. CoDE ch. 2, art. 1, § 1 (Michie 1966). "The common law of
England, so far as it is not repugnant to the principles of the Constitution of
this State, shall continue in force within the same, except in those respects
wherein it was altered by the general assembly of Virginia before the twentieth
day of June, eighteen hundred and sixty-three, or has been, or shall be,
by the
44 legislature of this State."
Adkins v. St. Francis Hospital, 149 W. Va. 705, 720, 143 S.E.2d
154, 163 (1965).
45 Seagraves v. Legg, 147 W. Va. 331, 338, 127 S.E 2d 605 608 (1962);
State v. Arbogast, 133 W. Va. 672, 675, 57 S.E.2d 715, 717 1950); Leros
v. Parker, 79 W. Va. 700, 704, 91 S.E. 660, 661 (1917).
46 Currence v. Ralphsnyder, 108 W. Va. 194, 151 S.E. 700, 702 (1929);
See Wyckoff, Our Changing Common Law, 48 W. VA. L. Q. 24 (1941).
4, But see State v. Arbogast, 133 W. Va. 672, 674, 57 S.E.2d 715, 717
(1950). The court rejected the contention that when the reason for the
rule had ceased, the court could change the rule. The Court held that under
the Constitution and laws only the Legislature could change the common law
rule. However it apparently was not contended that the maxim of abolishing
the rule when the reason ceases to exist, was itself part of the common law.
No West Virginia case has been found where this contention was made.
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a view of the common law would be void as repugnant to the
constitution.4 8 The West Virginia court has also stated that they are
"unmistakably enjoined to leave drastic changes in the common law
to the legislative branch of the State government." 4' 9 The questions
of whether the adoption of comparative negligence by the court
would be a drastic change, or whether such action violates the
principle of separation of powers, would themselves be questions
for the West Virginia court to resolve.
Martin Joseph Glasser

Torts-Licensed Driver's Assumption of Risk While Instructing
an Unlicensed Operator
P was giving D, a novice driver, driving instructions when the
car ran off the road and P was injured. P sued D for her injuries
and the trial court entered a judgment non obstante verdicto in favor
of D, and P appealed. Held, reversed. One who accompanies a
driver who possesses only a learner's permit for the purpose of giving
driving instructions does not assume the risk of injury as a matter of
law. Chalmers v. Willis, 231 A.2d 70 (Md. 1967).
The dissenting judge felt that there was no valid factual question
as to the cause of the accident and that the accident was the result
of the defendant's inexperience which was the very factor of which
the plaintiff, as a matter of law, had assumed the risk.' The majority
conceded that when the undisputed facts allow it, a plaintiff may be
said to have assumed the risk as a matter of law. The court felt,
however, that in this case and the great majority of cases there are
several factual determinations which must be made by the jury
before the law can be applied to the particular case.2 The jury might
have to determine any one or more of these factual questions:
whether the plaintiff was accompanying the defendant to satisfy
a statutory provision or to give active instructions; whether the
driver, based on his experience doing the act that caused the accident,
could still properly be held negligent in spite of his inexperience;
whether the plaintiff, based on the facts, could have reasonably
art. VIII, § 21.
Cunningham v. County Court of Wood County, 148 W. Va. 303, 308,
134 S. E.2d 725, 728 (1964).
' Chalmers v. Willis, 231 A.2d 70, 76 (Md. 1967) (dissenting opinion).
2 Chalmers v. Willis, 231 A.2d 70, 73 (Md. 1967).
48 W. VA. CONST.
'0
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